The Ideas of History, or
How Was "History" Historicized in Nineteenth-Century Western Thought?

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Synopsis

Time, as well as space, had been an essential component of human life, so every sensible being must have had a certain sense of time since the earliest antiquity of human history. However, that sense of time was different from the reformed temporality after the late eighteenth century. Before then, time had been bracketed out to somewhere beyond the bounds of inquiry, so as not to affect the stable order of the universe. The Enlightenment ideas of progress and perfectibility of the human race obviously stressed temporality, but the whole intellectual climate was in favor of order, and strenuously militating against the fulfillment of historicity.

The purpose of this essay is to trace back to the beginning of the modern idea of history roughly around the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, and ascertain how history fully realized its temporal overtone, which we usually take for granted, but actually is a product of the complex of social, intellectual and historical backgrounds. The temporalization of the world and its history, as it will turn out in the following pages, was effected by the rise of the individual and the discovery of geological deep time, among other factors. History was not born history, but historicized in the course of history. This historical context of history is worth knowing, and I believe it would stimulate the further development of practical and effective methodologies of historical studies.

Key words: Historiography, Historicity, Geological Imagination, The Order of Things, The Great Chain of Being

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So forget, indeed, your revolutions, your turning-points, your grand
metamorphosis of history. Consider, instead, the slow arduous process,
the interminable and ambiguous process -- the process of human settlement --
of land reclamation.

What is this -- a biology lesson?

No I prefer, in order to point a contrast, to call it Natural History.

Which doesn’t go anywhere. Which cleaves to itself. Which perpetually
travels back to where it came from.

Graham Swift, Waterland

I almost feel guilty to begin with this all too clichéd question: What is history? History, as a modern
scientific discipline, established itself in decided contrast with the mythological, biblical, and hence fabricated
preconceptions which had dominated the pre-nineteenth-century understanding of human events. What
mattered then was the solid factuality of historical evidence. The historian’s confidence in empirical facts was
so high, the main task of history was to accumulate as many facts as possible, and this completely independent
of any a priori assumption. The nineteenth-century cult of facts taught the historian only to take care of
amassing raw data and, for the rest of the job, let those facts speak themselves. The more facts, the better,
and the less theoretical speculation, the even better. The motto was found in the freely quoted phrase of
Leopold von Ranke’s: wie es eigentich gewesen.

Twentieth-century historiography, in retrospect, was a strenuous effort to review and revise this hard
empiricist, objectivist tradition in history. Chiefly in opposition to late-nineteenth-century scientific reductionism
and universalism like Henry Adams’s thermodynamic history, American progressive historians -- Carl Becker
and Charles Beard, among others -- were more willing to be interpretive in source analysis, with the aim of
grasping the human past within a thematically local and pragmatic framework. José Ortega y Gasset, too, suggested
that the empiricist tradition of modern scientific history had long slighted an original and creative
“incitement” or “aspiration” in human life, which was never to be contained in colorless scientific causation
(Ortega, 21, 113). Edward Hallett Carr’s famous lecture series, What Is History?, duly recapitulated these
shifts of focus in the twentieth-century climate of historical writing, from an impersonal and mechanical chain of
causes and effects to the subjective aspects of human activities, including historical writing itself. Along with
Hayden White’s schematization of historical narratives as rhetorical constructs, the renewed idea of history
increasingly diverts itself from Rankean “what actually happened” onto how it is narrated or, from the content
of history to its authorial, social, and political context. The historian was, or even had to be, invisible in the
scientific representation of the past, but he now acknowledges himself responsible for plotting a story after his
own method and art.

Practically, the growing interest in “the historian’s craft” is important and even natural for every working
historian, but in terms of philosophy of history, the idea of history per se deserves as much attention, too,
especially now that recent studies on Western epistemology have shown that history has its own history, or
pre-history, as it were. The purpose of this essay is, then, to trace back to the beginning of the modern idea
of history roughly around the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, and ascertain how history fully realized its temporal overtone, which we usually take for granted, but actually is a product of the complex of social, intellectual and historical backgrounds. History was not born history, but historicized in the course of history. This historical context of history is worth knowing, and I believe it would stimulate the further development of practical and effective methodologies of historical studies.

First of all, the definition of history. According to The Oxford English Dictionary, the term, in the contemporary usage, usually signifies a series of past events as well as the written record of them. It is likely to refer to important or “historic” events and figures, but in any case, its overall implication lies in the temporality of human affairs or actions, as is suggested by such phrases in the lexical definition as “in order of time,” “formation and growth,” and “course of existence or life, career.” As I hinted above, however, it was not until as late as the turn of the eighteenth century to the nineteenth that history was fully temporalized into its modern dynamic sense. Etymologically, the term derives way back from the ancient ἱστορία or historia, denoting “A systematic account (without reference to time) of a set of natural phenomena, as those connected with a country, some division of nature or group of natural objects, a species of animals or plants, etc.” Now rare as it is, the vestige of the original signification can be found in “natural history.” History used to be a predominantly atemporal and static mode of representation; or to put it the other way round, the world, through the lens of history, looked strangely uneventful, timeless, and universally in order.

History, in its original context, was an idea directly antithetical to that of philosophy, which took care of abstract generality or theory, while the former referred to the descriptive knowledge of particulars. Unlike the Aristotelian interest in universal and common experiences, history then bore on unmediated unique observations with little, if any, implication in temporality, and its effect was to excerpt and fragment human experience into decontextualized facts. This descriptive nature branded history as an inferior way of knowing, a mere purveyor of particular samples for higher philosophical abstraction. Aristotle’s famous dichotomy of poetry and history allegedly originated the millenia-long story of the latter’s humiliation: “poetry speaks more of universals, history of particulars.” Things stood the same well into the seventeenth century, as Galileo downplayed historians as mere “memory experts,” in strict contrast with speculative philosophers like himself. As Baconian empiricism got rooted in the Western intellect, history was reevaluated because of its theory-free objectivity, which constituted an essential part of inductive sciences; and in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, moreover, the so-called “spirit of system” possessed those descriptive “memory experts,” inciting them to seek after their own way of synthetic systematization, independent of the philosopher’s power of deductive reasoning. And yet, no matter how higher history climbed up the hierarchy of sciences, the basic fact remained that it always predicated itself on empirical observations of particulars, and was nothing to disturb the essentially static order of the universe. It represented the thing as it was, and never dreamed of questioning why and how it was. History only began to take notice of the causal and temporal sequence of events toward the end of the eighteenth century. Then here is a question: what happened to history in the late eighteenth century? Or what was responsible
for its reformation into a mode of temporal representation? From the viewpoint of epistemological history, Michel Foucault addresses to the very question in *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1966; English translation, 1970). The two centuries leading up to the late eighteenth were, according to Foucault, the age of order, distinguished by its desire for “an exhaustive ordering of the world” on the timeless table (Foucault, 74). This passion for order was legitimized by the Enlightened confidence both in the static perfection of the universe and in the all-embracing ability of representation. The mentality of the era envisioned the world as an essentially static and changeless scale, in which everything kept its right place and didn’t deviate from it. And the whole domain of empiricity, “at the same time describable and orderable,” could be fully represented on universal explanatory reference grid, arranged by differences and identities of its visible surface features (Foucault, 158). Evidently, this is nothing but a natural historical endeavor for all-inclusive taxonomy like the Linnean system of nomenclature, and, as a matter of fact, natural history was one of the three sciences of order that established themselves on the eighteenth-century Classical *episteme* (the other two were general grammar and science of wealth). Not just natural history, any history didn’t go beyond the confines of the tabulated order. Human history, if there had been anything like that, would have been safely incorporated as a part of timeless natural history. The human species, too, had its right place in the eternal order of being, and was not allowed to quit its post. In the eighteenth-century universe, every good cobbler stuck right to his last.

Although Foucault doesn’t mention it, the same point is made in Arthur O. Lovejoy’s *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (1936). Just like Foucault’s, the book is an extraordinary specimen of erudition, but the main thesis is plain as day. Through the Middle Ages to the late eighteenth century, there had been three unit-ideas working as an undercurrent of Western thought, that is, plenitude, continuity, and gradation of the created world. Nature was packed air-tight with no gap, forming an uninterrupted continuum of being, and this order of things was graded hierarchically from top (human beings, of course) to bottom (minerals). Hence the fusion of these unit-ideas into that potent trope, the Great Chain of Being.

The result was the conception of the plan and structure of the world which, through the Middle Ages and down to the late eighteenth century, many philosophers, most men of science, and indeed, most educated men, were to accept without question, -- the conception of the universe as a “Great Chain of Being,” composed of an immense, or -- by the strict but seldom rigorously applied logic of the principle of continuity -- of an infinite, number of links ranging in hierarchical order from the meagerest kind of existents, which barely escape non-existence, through “every possible” grade up to the *ens perfectissimum* -- or, in a somewhat more orthodox version, to the highest possible kind of creature, between which and the Absolute Being the disparity was assumed to be infinite -- every one of them differing from that immediately above and that immediately below it by the “least possible” degree of difference. (Lovejoy, 59)

God created the universe all sufficient and “good” for itself. The logical assumption was that the universal order of being, perfected at the Creation once and for all, would be immutable as it was and had been. Every
new finding in natural history -- a hitherto unknown species, for example -- didn't disturb it any, but only to be fit into the infinitesimally graduated scale of being and regarded "as a step towards the completion of a systematic structure of which the general plan was known in advance, an additional bit of empirical evidence of the truth of the generally accepted and cherished scheme of things" (Lovejoy, 232). The concept of the Great Chain of Being was invoked thus "to justify the belief in the rationality, the perfection, the static completeness, the orderliness and coherency of reality" (Lovejoy, 288). Here again, the world was conceived as eternal, static, and immutable, and this attested to the self-contained perfection of the Creator.

No matter how strong the intellectual predilection for timelessness and stasis was, however, the world was obviously so eventful, marked with unmistakable signs of diversity and temporal transformation, too. Mutability was the basic fact of every mortal life. In the final analysis, the trope of the Chain of Being was a product of "the general habit of thinking in terms of species" (Lovejoy, 231). A species, not an individual, was the unit of the universe, and even if a single individual underwent any sort of transmutation or simply passed away, a species, as a collective entity, could remain as it was (although we now know even a species could be extinct). "A species is 'a whole independent of number, independent of time; a whole always living, always the same; a whole which was counted as one among the works of the creation, and therefore constitutes a single unit in the creation'" (Lovejoy, 230). On the other hand, an individual is finite, changing, transient. What the late eighteenth century witnessed and the nineteenth century confirmed was the decline of species-thinking and the corresponding rise of individuals-thinking. The individuals, having been hidden behind the thick shadow of species, then finally came to the fore, and from their local and finite perspective, the world turned out always changing in the dynamic process of temporality. Now the Great Chain of Being was not a mere inventory of invariable types. It instead was conceived "as the program of nature, which is being carried out gradually and exceedingly slowly in the cosmic history" (Lovejoy, 244). Of course, "history" in this context signified a train of events unfolded in the course of time. At long last, it switched its focus from the world of being to that of becoming.

Where Lovejoy uses "individual," Foucault chooses words like "subjectivity," "interiority," or "psychology," and his discussion follows the same story of the temporalization of the universe through the renewed interest in finite and mutable individual lives. Like Lovejoy's "individual," Foucault's "subjectivity" and "interiority" referred to what had been buried in depth, beyond the reach of representation. The Classical programme of universal tabulation represented such a static flat world, but beneath the serene surface of which, the late eighteenth century discovered, something elusive, uncanny, but vital lay unnoticed. Utterly unrepresented on the surface level, "The obscure but stubborn spirit ... and the endless effort of life" nonetheless proved powerfully vibrating as a hidden cause for the outer being (Foucault, 209). The development of Cuvier's comparative anatomy was one of the symbolic examples of the contemporary attention to the interiority, the urge to explore for a cause in depth. Once an impersonal fixture installed on the great taxonomic table, man was now emancipated into the process of causal sequence called life. Order was thus replaced with history as a new paradigm of knowledge.

Just as the Order in Classical thought was not the visible harmony of things, or their observed arrangement, regularity, or symmetry, but the particular space of their
being, that which, prior to all effective knowledge, established them in the field of knowledge, so History, from the nineteenth century, defines the birthplace of the empirical, that from which, prior to all established chronology, it derives its own being.... History, as we know, is certainly the most erudite, the most aware, the most conscious, and possibly the most cluttered area of our memory; but it is equally the depths from which all beings emerge into their precarious, glittering existence. Since it is the mode of being of all that is given us in experience, History has become the unavoidable element in our thought. (Foucault, 219)

Both Lovejoy and Foucault set the origin of human historicity in the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century when the discovery of the individual lives conduced to the temporalization of the static worldview in the Classical episteme. That was the great age of the individual, whose power was felt keenly in a series of liberal revolutions in both sides of the Atlantic, and moreover, nineteenth-century Romanticism would soon unleash its individualist potentiality aesthetically as well as intellectually. No wonder, then, the contemporary rise of the individual had so wide an influence on Western society at large as to affect and reform the epistemological framework of the time, and Foucault and Lovejoy illustrates it persuasively. And yet, it feels as if there is something still left untold. A hint lies dormant in Foucault’s wording, in which the newly discovered dimension of individuality and temporality is imagined as that of “buried depth” (Foucault, 229). The power of the individual is conceived as a drive from the deep, “a subjectivity, a consciousness, a singular effort of cognition ... the ‘psychological’ individual who from the depth of his own history, or on the basis of the tradition handed on to him, is trying to know” (Foucault, 240). And temporality, too, turns out to be time in depth: “Thus, European culture is inventing for itself a depth in which what matters is no longer identities, distinctive characters, permanent tables with all their possible paths and routes, but great hidden forces developed on the basis of their primitive and inaccessible nucleus, origin, causality, and history” (Foucault, 251). While the tabulated order is a form of knowledge horizontally deployed, historicity, Foucault points out, realizes its function of causal sequence “in the vertical plane” (Foucault, 230). What is implied but not quite articulated here is geological deep time.9 Surprisingly enough, Foucault doesn't make a single direct mention of geology in his book -- and Lovejoy doesn't either, as surprisingly -- in spite of these frequent intimations. The ellipsis is even mysterious, considering that the period in question is coterminal with the era when geology came into being as a historical science.

No doubt, geology was another most important factor for the contemporary realization of temporality and historicity. Roy Porter's exposition of the development of geology best supplements Foucault’s and Lovejoy’s arguments at where they both are curiously tacit. Earth sciences, as is shown in Porter’s The Making of Geology: Earth Science in Britain 1660-1815 (1977), traced exactly the same route of gradual temporalization as the Classical table or the Great Chain of Being did. Originally, the interest in the earth was confined to the natural historical study of particular stones and rocks, or mineralogy, as it was called then. Each mineral object was picked out for analysis and thus decontextualized out of its formation, that is, out of time. Stones had their reasons of being only when snugly tabulated into their own compartments of the mineralogist’s cabinet. As the eighteenth century rolled on, however, more and more fieldwork findings revealed multiple changes in the
state of the earth, challenging the divine simultaneity of the universe (the Creation at one time). Earth scientists then could agree that the earth had not eternally been in its present condition. "Human evidence told of change. In any case, present processes, however slight, were modifying the Earth, however slowly. Hence no theory sought to 'explain' the Earth by trying to prove that it had always existed in its current state. The problem, in other words, was to explain change" (Porter, 71). And change presupposed temporality.

The new recognition of changes in the earth's crust diminished the evidential value of the displaced mineral objects, and put corresponding emphasis upon rocks in situ, or rather strata and their successive formation in time. The layers of stratified rock masses betrayed "a significant history -- being formed at different times, from different materials, under different forces, and that strata could be vestiges of history" (Porter, 121-22). To be sure, a sect of theorists explained them away as evidences of the power of miraculous catastrophes like the Deluge and thereby imposed the biblically-correct short time-scale on the earth's history (it was only six thousand years or so since God created the world, or they thought so). The catastrophist view was increasingly dismissed, however. The wide variety and diversity of strata could not be the products of a couple of miraculous revolutions during a relatively short period, but took quite a lengthy time-scale to be baked up by the natural power that had worked slowly and uniformly just as it did now and most likely would. This uniformitarian story totally transformed the long-cherished model of the timeless universe into a truly dynamic process of becoming, in which temporality occupied the central place. Everything was found changing at any moment, and the world was never exempted from the modifying power of cruel historicity.\(^{10}\)

By the early nineteenth century, many traditional (i.e., natural historical, descriptive atemporal) earth sciences had been reformed into geology, "The newly dynamic study of landforms [which] linked together Earth's past and present, surface and structure" (Porter, 183). To name a couple of epochal works that most contributed to this generic reconstruction, James Hutton introduced the uniformitarian framework with the publication of *Theory of the Earth* (1788 and enlarged in 1795), and a generation later, Charles Lyell's *Principles of Geology* (1830-33) reconfirmed the importance of historical dynamics for geological thinking. Although geology was (and is) a recondite pursuit of knowledge, its popularity in the nineteenth century should not be underestimated. In nineteenth-century England, for example, there mushroomed a number of gentlemen's societies, agricultural and industrial societies, and all of these institutions, as well as scientific societies and museums, diffused the knowledge and methods of geological sciences, because the interest in the earth had had much to do with practical activities, like mining, surveying and land-drainage. Along with the increase of popular scientific lecturing, moreover, the upswing in scientific publications furthered the popularization of geology.\(^{11}\) Popular digests, compendia and textbooks flooded contemporary society with geological topics. By the end of the eighteenth century, approximately five hundred works on geology had been published in the newly independent United States, and fifty years later, the number doubled with the growing speed of the publication rate, so published information of geological phenomena was pretty widely diffused in mid-century American society.\(^{12}\) To boot, even works of fine art featured geologists and geological curiosities, and this testified to the geology's appeal to many different levels of society and the strong interest in the subject on the artists' part as well.\(^{13}\)

The social impact of geology was that wide and strong. Presumably, geological imagination, if not literacy, gripped the Western mind pretty firmly by the early nineteenth century. The historicizing influence of geology
was not limited to the small membership of the scientific community, but pervaded every aspect of the whole intellectual life of the day.

The gradual making of geology is, however, of significance in its own right, as an index and integral part of important currents changing European society and ideas. A vision of man, Nature and society which had been fundamentally degenerative, static, or at most cyclical during the Middle Ages and in early modern times was yielding to one which was dynamic, progressive, developmental and finally evolutionary. Geology was the product, the beneficiary of these shifts. But it was also the basis of them. Long before it was accepted that life, or man, had a fully extended history, or that the meaning of life and man were to be grasped through their development, the history of the Earth had been revealed and absorbed. The antiquity, history and development of the Earth underpinned the nineteenth-century temporalization of the science of its inhabitants. (Porter, 221)

Geology was one crucial precondition for the full temporalization of the Western world. Through geology, again, “history” shed off its former descriptive and static connotation and assumed its present significance of dynamic becoming.

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Time, as well as space, had been an essential component of human life, so every sensible being must have had a certain sense of time since the earliest antiquity of human history. As we have seen so far, however, that sense of time was different from the reformed temporality after the late eighteenth century. Before then, time had been bracketed out to somewhere beyond the bounds of inquiry, so as not to affect the stable order of the universe. The Enlightenment ideas of progress and perfectibility of the human race obviously stressed temporality, but the whole intellectual climate was in favor of order, and strenuously militating against the fulfillment of historicity. Perfectibility was nothing but an item on the preordained agenda, and progress was a sort of mock-evolutionism, “in the sense that all the points of the taxonomy are affected by a temporal index, with the result that ‘evolution’ is nothing more than the interdependent and general displacement of the whole scale from the first of its elements to the last…. [T]his ‘evolution’ keeps intact the relation that exists between the different species: if one of them, in the process of perfecting itself, should attain the degree of complexity possessed beforehand by the species one step higher, this does not mean that the latter has thereby been overtaken, because, carried onward by the same momentum, it cannot avoid perfecting itself to an equivalent degree” (Foucault, 151). The disrupting Dionysian power of temporality had long been contained in the Apollonian order. Or one might say this way, the latent Romantic impulsion wanted yet more energy to break through the Classical rule.

The temporalization of the world and its history was effected by the rise of the individual and the discovery of geological deep time in the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. To wrap up the present essay,
let me suggest a possible approach to historical writing in this transitional period, which will be the main topic
of my next paper. While history was historicized by geology or especially by its stratified image of temporality, it
was most likely to take over the stadialist model of time sequence along with progressive dynamics. If so, then
how did history improve that image of layered time in its narrative? Geological deep time was, moreover, a
secular, uniform and impersonal mode of temporality. The age of the individual was followed by that of the
modern nation-state, and according to Benedict Anderson, the shape of the nation-state was materialized by
virtue of “homogeneous, empty time,” the mechanically measured uniform temporality which created a sense
of simultaneity or “temporal coincidence” through the spatial expanse, and only by sharing that experience of
simultaneity, the widely scattered nation could imagine itself as a whole.14 Anderson names clock and calendar
alone as the embodiments of Benjaminian “homogeneous, empty time,” but geological deep time is quite
eligible for it, because nothing is more uniform and impersonal. Then the issue will center on the relationship
between the geological uniformitarian temporality and history of the modern nation state in particular, and it
is not a coincidence that they both came into being in the late eighteenth century. Perhaps, American history,
among others, provides a most convenient proving ground for the study of such an unexpected combination.
For, not just one of the first modern nation-states brought forth by a liberal revolution, America is the country
where “Of all the sciences, geology seems to be the one most closely associated with the United States -- a
land of mountains and rivers, of glaciers and prairies, atolls, hot springs, badlands, mines, and gushers.”15

In actuality, nineteenth-century America produced a great many historians. Francis Parkman’s history of the
colonial America, the one I have been addressing to over the last several years, is most rewarding for this
purpose of study, and I am going to finalize my discussion on the geological imagination in his historical
writings.16

Notes
1. Henry Adams’s thermodynamic history was one of the most expressive culminations of modern empirical
history. As for the tradition of this type of historical writing, see Yoshinari Yamaguchi, “Toward the
Impersonality of History: Science and Inductive Reasoning in the 19th-Century American Historiography,”
2. As for the pragmatic vein of the twentieth-century American historiography, see Cushing Strout, The
Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard (1958; Ithaca: Cornell University
3. Actually, Carr’s lecture series would be better titled “What Is an Historian?” See Edward Hallett Carr,
What Is History?: The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures Delivered at the University of Cambridge January-
4. Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1973)
5. I used male pronouns to indicate the historian, because female historians were excluded from the
tradition of scientific history, and thus on a different track of development, approaching a more literary style
of historical writing. For the gender issues in historiography, see Eileen Ka-May Cheng, The Plain and

6. Of course, one of the most texts born out of this interest is Marc Block, The Historian’s Craft (1954)


8. As for the descriptive nature of early modern history and its later development into systematic representation, the following anthology of science studies is most illuminating: Gianna Pomata and Nancy G. Siraisi, eds., Historia: Empiricism and Erudition in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005). Each essay in this book illustrates the descriptiveness of historia in a variety of contexts of intellectual pursuits, such as medicine, physics, philology, and of course, natural history; but among others, Pomata and Siraisi’s “Introduction” and Donald R. Kelley’s “Between History and System” offer an historical overview of the importance of historia in early modern learning and thus serve as a good introduction to the issue as a whole. The part touching upon Galileo in this paragraph is from Kelly’s essay noted above. As a purveyor of particular evidence for empirical sciences, historia was a major manufacturer of what Mary Poovey calls the “modern fact,” a “nugget of experience detached from theory.” Poovey’s account of the development of the “modern fact” -- from just an example of some preset principle to evidence for a new generalization -- was very helpful for us to understand the implications of historia in modern scientific disciplines. See Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).


11. As for the nineteenth-century popularization of geology, see Porter, The Making of Geology, 94-103.


13. Ralph Waldo Emerson referred favorably to the development of geology in his journals. An Emerson’s contemporary, Herman Melville also featured a great geological curiosity, the Balanced Rock, in Pierre; or, The Ambiguities (1852), and a utilitarian geologist named Margoth in Clarel: A Poem and Pilgrimage in the Holy Land (1876). As for other literary references to geology, see Dennis R. Dean, “The Influence of Geology on American Literature and Thought,” in Schneer, ed., Two Hundred Years of Geology in America, 289-303.

Thomas Cole’s series of historical landscapes, The Course of Empire (1833-36) is well-known for its
geological leitmotif, an erratic boulder placed in the upper center of each painting. As for the influence of
geology on Cole’s works, see Barbara Novak, *Nature and Culture: American Landscape and Painting, 1825-
Geological Ideas and the Imaginary Landscaped of Thomas Cole,” in Schneer, ed., *Two Hundred Years of
Geology in America*, 53-71.


16. I have published two essays on Parkman’s historiography. See Yoshinari Yamaguchi, “The Panoramic
Point of View and Visual Training for Americans: ‘Bird’s-Eye View’ Stories of Two Travelers,” *Review of
American Literature* 21 (Spring 2009): 73-97 and “The Traveling Historian: Spatiality and Memories of
Landscape in Francis Parkman’s Historiography,” in Hiroko Washizu and Yoichiro Miyamoto, eds., *Chi-no-
And the third and probably last one will be presented in the annual conference of the American Literature
Society of Japan on October 9, 2010. The title is, “History in Depth: Geological Imagination in nineteenth-
century American Historiography.”

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